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Background. Ebola virus disease (EVD) in health workers (HWs) has been a major challenge during the 2014–2015 outbreak.
We examined factors associated with Ebola virus exposure and mortality in HWs in Kenema District, Sierra Leone.
Methods. We analyzed data from the Sierra Leone National Viral Hemorrhagic Fever Database, contact tracing records, Kenema
Government Hospital (KGH) staff and Ebola Treatment Unit (ETU) rosters, and burial logs.
Results. From May 2014 through January 2015, 600 cases of EVD originated in Kenema District, including 92 (15%) HWs, 66
(72%) of whom worked at KGH. Among KGH medical staff and international volunteers, 18 of 62 (29%) who worked in the ETU
developed EVD, compared with 48 of 83 (58%) who worked elsewhere in the hospital. Thirteen percent of HWs with EVD reported
contact with EVD patients, while 27% reported contact with other infected HWs. The number of HW EVD cases at KGH declined
roughly 1 month after implementation of a new triage system at KGH and the opening of a second ETU within the district. The case
fatality ratio for HWs and non-HWs with EVD was 69% and 74%, respectively.
Conclusions. The cluster of HW EVD cases in Kenema District is one of the largest ever reported. Most HWs with EVD had
potential virus exposure both inside and outside of hospitals. Prevention measures for HWs must address a spectrum of infection
risks in both formal and informal care settings as well as in the community.
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The 2014–2015 Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in West
Africa is the most widespread in history [1]. During EVD
outbreaks, health workers (HWs) are at signiﬁcant risk of
EVD infection because, in addition to community exposures,
they carry risk of exposure during patient care. Nosocomial
transmission has led to major morbidity and mortality in
prior and current EVD outbreaks [2–9]. Through 1 July 2015,
the World Health Organization (WHO) reported 874 cases of
EVD with 509 deaths (case fatality ratio 58%) in HWs in West
Africa, including 305 cases and 221 deaths in Sierra Leone [10].
The ﬁrst EVD case in Sierra Leone was reported in May 2014
in Kailahun District, which shares borders with Guinea and Li-
beria; EVD spread to neighboring Kenema District in June
2014. Kenema Government Hospital (KGH), with support
from theWHO, was the only facility in the country that provided
care to EVD patients at the onset of the outbreak. KGH attend-
ed primarily to patients from Kenema District and the southern
half of Kailahun District, but received cases from all other areas
of the country as the outbreak progressed. A second Ebola treat-
ment unit (ETU) managed by the nongovernmental organiza-
tion Médecins Sans Frontières was established in Kailahun in
July 2014 [11].
KGH is a 350-bed regional hospital covering a catchment
area of approximately 670 000 people [12].Based on an employee
roster, KGH has 472 staff and volunteers. Prior to this outbreak,
KGH was comprised of surgical, adult medicine, pediatric, and
maternity wards, as well as human immunodeﬁciency virus/
AIDS and tuberculosis specialty clinics. KGH has also served
as the national referral center for Lassa fever, which is hyperen-
demic in eastern Sierra Leone [13]. A 25-bed dedicated Lassa
ward divided into rooms with 2–4 beds each has been
variably maintained at KGH since the 1970s, and a specialized
diagnostic laboratory was established in 2004 [14]. At the onset
of the EVD outbreak in Sierra Leone, the Lassa ward and labora-
tory were comprised of <20 people, including a doctor, nurses,
laboratory technicians, and surveillance ofﬁcers with extensive
experience in the diagnosis and medical care of Lassa fever
patients. The Lassa ward was subsequently converted into what
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initially was the country’s only ETU. Forty-one (9%) of KGH
staff worked in the ETU, augmented by 21 international workers.
As the number of EVD patients increased, KGH established
3 additional makeshift ETU wards for conﬁrmed and suspected
EVD cases, eventually totaling approximately 100 beds. Despite
this, the ETU became overrun, ultimately resulting in a dangerously
low HW-to-patient ratio, depletion of personal protective equip-
ment (PPE), and inconsistent supplies of water and electricity.
The situation was further exacerbated by an HW strike at KGH
over delayed hazard pay starting 20 June 2014 (Figure 1), at times
resulting in just a few HWs to manage up to 100 EVD patients [15].
KGH remained the largest ETU in Sierra Leone until 15 September
2014, when the International Federation of Red Cross and RedCres-
cent Societies (IFRC) opened a second ETU in Kenema District.
Despite the previous experience with Lassa fever patients, an
unusually high number of Ebola virus infections and deaths
were reported among HWs at KGH and in Kenema District
[7]. To better understand how HWs became infected, as well
as factors associated with infection, we explored potential sources
of exposure and clinical variables of EVD in HWs in Kenema
District, with a focus on KGH.
METHODS
Study Design
We analyzed data for suspected, probable, and conﬁrmed EVD
cases in HWs in Kenema District between 1 May 2014 and
31 January 2015 [16]. For comparison, we also included cases
in non-HWs in Kenema District, as well as cases that were
transferred to KGH for treatment from other districts in Sierra
Leone during this period. We excluded persons <18 years of age
to allow appropriate comparison between HWs and non-HWs.
We also excluded cases that did not meet the WHO case deﬁ-
nition for EVD [16].We deﬁned an HW as anyone who worked
in a healthcare facility or engaged in healing practices (eg, tra-
ditional healers) and clinical staff as persons who have tradi-
tional patient-care roles and routinely have direct contact with
patients (eg, doctors, nurses, and laboratory technicians). For
non-HWs, for whom we often had incomplete data, missing
dates were inferred in a similar manner as previously described
[1]. For HWs, for whom more complete data were available,
where dates of symptom onset or death were missing, they
were imputed based on the addition or subtraction of 12 days,
which was the average time from symptom onset until death in
fatal cases in HWs with available dates. Laboratory conﬁrma-
tion of EVD was performed following established protocols
[17, 18].
Data Collection
The primary data source used was the Viral Hemorrhagic Fever
database, which is the national EVD database maintained by the
Sierra Leone Ministry of Health and Sanitation and consists of
demographic and epidemiological as well as limited clinical
Figure 1. Epidemic curve for cases of Ebola virus disease, Kenema District, Sierra Leone, 1 May 2014–31 January 2015. Arrows (from left to right) indicate the beginning of
the health worker strike, implementation of the new triage system at Kenema Government Hospital, and the opening of the International Federation of Red Cross Ebola Treat-
ment Unit on the outskirts of Kenema town.
Ebola Infection in Healthcare Workers • CID 2016:63 (15 August) • 455
 at St A
ndrew
s U
niversity Library on Septem
ber 1, 2016
http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
data. For HWs, we supplemented this database with contact
tracing records to obtain additional information about contacts
with a known or suspected case, hospital staff and ETU rosters
to identify and/or conﬁrm status as an HW, and hospital re-
cords, burial logs, and public obituaries at KGH to determine
outcomes. The Kenema District Health Management Team
and Ebola Response Task Force approved the collection, analy-
sis, and reporting of anonymous data as part of the outbreak
response efforts.
Statistical Analysis
We compared characteristics of HWs and non-HWs using
χ2 tests for categorical data and t tests for continuous variables.
We performed univariate and multivariable logistic regression
models using SAS software, version 9.4 (SAS Institute, Cary,
North Carolina) to estimate odds ratios (ORs) for associations
between potential risk factors for EVD and death with 95% con-
ﬁdence intervals (CIs). Variables that were signiﬁcant in univar-
iate analysis were evaluated in multiple logistic regression
models, while retaining biologically relevant variables. P values
of <.05 were considered to indicate statistical signiﬁcance.
RESULTS
For the study period there were 706 suspected, probable, and
conﬁrmed EVD cases originating in the KGH catchment area
of Kenema District and southern Kailahun or brought to
KGH from other parts of the country. All 14 districts of Sierra
Leone were represented. Of the 600 (85%) cases originating in
Kenema District, 92 (15%) were HWs, of whom 66 (72%)
worked at KGH, 17 (18%) at 8 other non-ETU health facilities
in the district, and 9 (10%) unknown (Table 1). Of the 66 HWs
with EVD at KGH, 58 (88%) held clinical positions, but only 18
(27%) worked in the ETU. EVD was diagnosed in 18 of 62
(29%) KGH ETU staff vs 48 (58%) of the estimated 83 clinical
staff working elsewhere in the hospital.
HWs were similar to non-HW cases of EVD with regard to
age and sex (Table 2). EVD in HWs was almost 8 times more
likely to be laboratory conﬁrmed (as opposed to probable or
suspected), likely reﬂecting HWs’ greater knowledge regarding
symptoms of EVD, acknowledgment of being in a high-risk
group, and ready access to laboratory testing. HWs were 2.5
times more likely to report fever than non-HWs, again probably
reﬂecting greater self-monitoring. HWs were signiﬁcantly more
likely than non-HWs to identify prior contact with someone with
EVD (42% vs 24%, respectively; OR, 2.9 [95% CI, 1.7–5.0]). Only
13% of the HW contacts with persons with EVD were with
patients, while 27% were with other sick HWs. HWs were half
as likely to report contact with sick family and relatives (43%
vs 80% for HWs and non-HWs, respectively; OR, 0.2 [95%
CI, .09–.5]). Although not statistically signiﬁcant, HWs were
half as likely to have touched a body at a funeral compared
with non-HWs.
There was no statistically signiﬁcant difference in mean time
to presentation (5.4 days for HWs vs 5.1 days for non-HWs;
P = .51) or days from disease onset until death (11.1 days for
HWs vs 8.9 days for non-HWs; P = .14). However, HWs
spent signiﬁcantly longer time admitted to the ETU before
being discharged (25 days for HWs vs 16 days for non-HWs;
P = .02).
Cases of EVD in HWs were identiﬁed throughout the study
period. HWs represented a larger proportion of all EVD cases,
sometimes up to 25%, prior to mid-September 2014, after
which only sporadic cases of EVD in HWs were seen (Figure 1).
This change corresponded to the implementation of a re-
vamped triage system for patients suspected of having EVD at
KGH on 19 August 2014, as well as the opening of the IFRC
ETU in September 2014. Taking these 2 events together, and
taking into account the maximum 21-day incubation period
for EVD, cases were more likely to be HWs at KGH than
non-HWs prior to implementation of the triage system and
opening of the new ETU (89% vs 54%, respectively; OR, 7.1
[95% CI, 3.6–13.9]), whereas this relationship was essentially in-
verted after these events (11% for HWs vs 46% for non-HWs;
OR, 0.1 [95% CI, .01–.3]).
Table 1. Occupations and Employment Facilities of 92 Health Workers
With Ebola Virus Disease in Kenema District, Sierra Leone, 1 May 2014–
31 January 2015
Characteristic No. (%a)
Occupation (n = 2)
Clinical 78 (85)
Nurse/nursing aid/state enrolled community health nurse 40 (43)
Laboratory technician 13 (14)
Maternal child health/traditional birth attendant 10 (11)
Doctor 4 (4)
Traditional healer 4 (4)
Community health officer/worker 3 (3)
Social worker 1 (1)
Vaccinator 1 (1)
Ward supervisor 1 (1)
Burial worker 1 (1)
Nonclinical 14 (15)
Administrative/supportiveb 6 (7)
Transportation 4 (4)
Otherc 4 (4)
Facility (n = 92)
Kenema Government Hospital 66 (72)
Other facility in Kenema District (non-ETU) 17 (18)
Unknown 9 (10)
Worked in Kenema Government Hospital ETU (n = 66)
Yes 18 (27)
No 48 (73)
Abbreviation: ETU, Ebola treatment unit.
a Cumulative percentage does not total 100% due to rounding.
b Includes cleaners, clerks, dispensers, and security.
c Social worker, student/volunteer, and unknown.
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Case fatality was 69% for HWs and 74% for non-HWs
(P = .30). In the univariate analysis combining both HWs and
non-HWs, factors associated with fatal EVD were age >45
years (OR, 3.4 [95% CI, 2.1–5.5]), presentation >7 days after
symptom onset (OR, 0.3 [95% CI, .2–.6]), and presence of
fever (OR, 2.4 [95% CI, 1.1–5.4]) (Table 3). There was no asso-
ciation between mortality and sex, designation as clinical or
nonclinical staff, facility where worked, or working/not working
in an ETU.
The ﬁnal multivariable model included age, sex, symptoms,
and time from symptom onset to ETU presentation. In this
model, only presentation >7 days after symptom onset was
associated with a signiﬁcantly decreased risk of death (OR, 0.3
[95% CI, .1–.8]), probably because most of these patients had
already passed the mean time to death for EVD, which is usu-
ally around 8–10 days [19, 20]. The odds of death in persons
≥45 years old was >2 times that of younger people, although
this result was no longer statistically signiﬁcant (OR, 2.2 [95%
CI, .9–5.0]).
DISCUSSION
We describe one of the largest clusters of EVD among HWs ever
reported. Eighty EVD cases in HWs were noted in the 1995 out-
break in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo, from var-
ious health centers [2]. Most HWs with EVD in Kenema had
numerous risk factors for virus exposure in ETUs, other areas
of the hospital, and in the community, making it difﬁcult to as-
certain where Ebola infection occurred. Furthermore, informal
discussions with many of the KGH HWs with EVD revealed no
discrete infecting events, such as needle-sticks or ﬂuid splashes
to mucous membranes, suggesting that such events were not
central to the high attack rates in this group.
In contrast to the Ebola virus outbreak in Kikwit, HW infec-
tions continued to occur in Kenema even after the creation of
the ETU and enhanced infection prevention and control (IPC)
measures, including provision of PPE. The large number of
Ebola virus infections in HWs at KGH seems all the more sur-
prising because, prior to the outbreak, KGHmight have reason-
ably been considered to be one of the best-prepared hospitals in
West Africa to care for EVD patients, considering the long ex-
perience with Lassa fever [14]. Previous training and experience
caring for Lassa fever may have indeed helped protect HWs
who worked in the ETU, perhaps explaining the lower EVD
incidence in this group relative to those who worked outside
the ETU.
With regard to possible exposures in the Lassa ward-turned-
ETU, we speculate that various underlying factors with anteced-
ents long before the beginning of the EVD outbreak may have
Table 2. Demographic Characteristics, Case Classification, Symptoms,
and Type of Contact Comparison Between Health Workers and Non–
Health Workers in Kenema District, Sierra Leone, 1 May 2014–31 January
2015
Characteristic HW, No. (%)
Non-HW,
No. (%)
Univariate Odds
Ratio (95% CI)
Age, y, median (IQR)
(excluding those
<18 y old)*
39.5 (30–50) 35.0 (25–50) . . .
Sex
Female 48/92 (52) 290/614 (47) 1.2 (.8–1.9)
Male 43/92 (47) 319/614 (52) 0.8 (.5–1.3)
Unknown 1/92 (1) 5/614 (1) 1.3 (.2–11.6)
Case classification
Confirmed 86/93 (93) 398/614 (65) 7.8 (3.3–18.1)
Probable 0/93 (0) 7/614 (1) 0.9 (.8–.9)
Suspected 6/93 (7) 209/614 (34) 0.1 (.1–.3)
Symptoms
Fever 66/76 (87) 380/526 (72) 2.5 (1.3–5.1)
Diarrhea 29/73 (40) 206/503 (40) 1.0 (.6–1.6)
Vomiting 29/73 (40) 205/507 (60) 1.0 (.6–1.6)
Fever, diarrhea,
or vomiting
73/80 (91) 432/548 (79) 2.8 (1.3–6.2)
Reported contact with
case of Ebola virus
disease
39/92 (42) 145/614 (24) 2.9 (1.7–5.0)a
Type of contact
Family and relatives 13/30 (43) 109/137 (80) 0.2 (.09–.5)
Health workers 8/30 (27) 3/137 (2) 16.2 (4.0–66.0)
Patients 4/30 (13) NA . . .
Friends 3/30 (10) 18/137 (13) 0.9 (.3–2.6)
Other 2/30 (7) 7/137 (5) 1.3 (.3–6.7)
Funeral attendance 5/70 (7) 62/423 (15) 0.4 (.2–1.2)
Touched body 1/3 (33) 31/53 (58) 0.4 (.03–4.2)
Bold signifies statistically significant figures.
Abbreviations: CI, confidence interval; HW, health worker; IQR, interquartile range; NA, not
applicable.
a Missing data were excluded in the calculation of the odds ratio.
* P value comparing the means = .41.
Table 3. Associations Between Demographic and Clinical Variables and
Ebola Virus Disease Mortality, Kenema District, Sierra Leone, 1 May 2014–
31 January 2015
Factor No.
Univariate Multivariable
OR (95% CI) P Value OR (95% CI) P Value
Age
<45 257/385 1.0 . . . 1.0 . . .
≥45 155/178 3.4 (2.1–5.5) <.0001 2.1 (.9–5.0) .081
Sex
Female 196/277 1.0 . . . 1.0 . . .
Male 213/282 1.3 (.9–1.9) .203 1.5 (.8–2.6) .209
Time to presentation
≤7 d 387/514 1.0 . . . 1.0 . . .
>7 d 25/49 0.3 (.2–.6) .0004 .3 (.1–.8) .013
Symptoms
Diarrhea 117/176 1.1 (.7–1.9) .681 1.3 (.7–2.6) .415
Fever 248/353 2.4 (1.1–5.4) .030 2.1 (.9–5.1) .087
Vomiting 119/183 0.9 (.5–1.5) .723 1.1 (.5–2.1) .818
Hosmer-Lemeshow test of goodness-of-fit was performed (P = .916).
Abbreviations: CI, confidence interval; OR, odds ratio.
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resulted in a high-risk environment for HWs. In recent decades,
the KGH Lassa fever program has been primarily laboratory
focused [14, 21]. Patient care aspects have been consistently
underresourced, with the Lassa ward itself in need of signiﬁcant
renovation and the reinforcement of appropriate IPC practice,
and supply of PPE inconsistent and piecemeal [21]. Somewhat
indicative of these suboptimal conditions is the observation that
Lassa virus infection frequently occurred in Lassa ward staff, in-
dicative of less-than-ideal IPC practices [14, 21, 22]. A consider-
able number of Lassa ward staff may have been immune to
Lassa fever from previous exposure either in the clinical setting
or in the community, giving a false sense of security with regard
to the efﬁcacy of current IPC practices [21]. It should also be
noted that the infectious dose of Ebola virus is considered to
be lower than that of Lassa virus [23, 24].
As the peak of the EVD outbreak hit eastern Sierra Leone,
KGH ETU became the major referral center for Kenema District,
southern Kailahun district, and all other areas of Sierra Leone.
ETU staff were overburdened, caring for a number of patients
well beyond their capacity, without sufﬁcient staff to always
work in pairs, as is recommended to ensure IPC practices, includ-
ing safe donning, dofﬁng, and decontamination. IPC practices
often quickly deteriorate under such circumstances, somewhat
independent of staff experience, leading to an increase in infec-
tion risk [25]. This dangerous situation was further exacerbated
by the KGHHW strike [15] and the loss of HWs to EVD, includ-
ing the doctor and nurse in charge of the KGH ETU, which
further decreased numbers and morale [26].
As often noted in hemorrhagic fever outbreaks, HWs were
among the ﬁrst documented cases of EVD in Kenema (Figure 1)
[2, 4, 27]. Monitoring of HWs as a sentinel group may be a log-
ical strategy for early detection in nonaffected regions. A sharp
decline in the number of EVD in HWs was noted after the im-
plementation of a revamped triage system at KGH, a ﬁnding
noted with the implementation of similar systems in previous
Ebola outbreaks [28–30] and indicative of the nonspeciﬁc clin-
ical presentation of EVD that makes distinction from many
other common febrile diseases difﬁcult [31]. The new triage sys-
tem, designed and built in collaboration with the IFRC, served
as the single point of entry to KGH for all patients and consisted
of a unidirectional, 2-stage process to more thoroughly evaluate
patients, improve patient ﬂow, and minimize cross-contamina-
tion resulting from overcrowding. Whereas the previous triage
system was managed by laboratory technicians in a small tent,
the new system consisted of nurses and cleaners trained and
supervised by the IFRC. After the new KGH triage was estab-
lished, 700 persons were screened and 69 patients were admit-
ted to the ETU during the ﬁrst week alone (S. Boye, personal
communication, 2014). The opening of the IFRC ETU on the
outskirts of Kenema town several weeks later further reduced
the burden of cases at the KGH ETU although, as only a few
patients were admitted to the IFRC facility per week for the
ﬁrst few weeks of operation, the impact was probably modest.
It should also be noted that the HW strike that began in June
2014 and persisted on and off for months resulted in dimin-
ished numbers of HWs entering the ETU, and thus diminished
risk from that source.
Although there were numerous vulnerabilities in the patient
care setting at KGH, both inside and outside the ETU, it would
be a mistake to focus exclusively on the hospital. Clearly, many
cases of Ebola infection in HWs were acquired elsewhere, as
evidenced by the fact that almost three-quarters of the cases
occurred in personnel who did not work in the ETU, including
in nonclinical staff. These ﬁndings are consistent with studies
in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Uganda where HWs in non-
ETU settings and those without traditional patient care roles
frequently became infected [6, 8, 9, 32].HWs are, after all, mem-
bers of the community, sharing many of the same transmission
risks from contact with family, relatives, and friends (Table 2).
In addition, it was widely suspected and anecdotally reported
that many HWs cared for patients outside of normal working
hours and settings, often without full PPE. The desire of
HWs to care for sick colleagues may pose a particular risk,
one for which compassion may at times supersede safety. In
one instance, an HW, who later died of EVD, was found in
the ETU attempting to start an intravenous line on an admitted
colleague with EVD, gloves being the only PPE worn. When no-
ticed and questioned the only response was “I am trying to help
my colleague!” Another HW at KGH was exposed and infected
while taking care of an orphan outside of an ETU when the
child became symptomatic [15].
Our study is subject to several limitations: (1) Although not
part of the study, we spoke with HWs to ascertain their expo-
sures whenever possible. However, because of its retrospective
nature, we were unable to interview all HW cases. (2) We
could not determine from the available data whether HW’s con-
tact with persons with EVD was protected or unprotected, or
whether breaches in protocol may have occurred, and thus
cannot make conclusions regarding the efﬁcacy or inefﬁcacy
of any given PPE or IPC measure. (3) We likely underestimated
the number of HWs in the community in Kenema (ie, those
who did not work at KGH). In addition, we used a broad def-
inition of HW, which included nontraditional patient care roles,
and some persons who ﬁt this deﬁnition may not have self-
identiﬁed as HWs when interviewed. (4) The only clinical
data available to us were the presence of fever, diarrhea, and
vomiting, hindering an in-depth analysis of the relationship
between clinical presentation and disease evolution. (5) Data
on HWs, especially those who developed EVD, may have
been more thoroughly recorded than data on non-HWs, poten-
tially confounding analyses of potential exposures and disease
outcomes between the 2 groups.
The large cluster of EVD cases among HWs in Kenema
District emphasizes the high burden of disease in HWs in the
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Ebola outbreak in West Africa, with important implications for
prevention. While much attention is rightly paid to IPC mea-
sures speciﬁc to the ETU, HWs may incur considerable risk in
other areas of the hospital, especially given the difﬁculty of mak-
ing a clinical diagnosis of EVD, as well as in their communities,
where they may continue to formally or informally practice their
profession. IPC measures must therefore address a spectrum of
risk factors related to formal care settings in the ETU, as well
as hospital-wide, and to informal patient care and social settings
in the community.
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